This paper studies whether in Pakistan the dynamic behavior of real GDP growth, unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections. We cover the period from 1973-2009.
Introduction
Political business cycle theory formalizes the common perception that politicians use expansionary economic policies in a pre-election period to enhance their chances of re-election.
1 Opportunistic politicians are primarily interested in retaining office. When they face an electorate that prefer high growth, low unemployment and low inflation politicians may use expansionary fiscal or monetary polices to create a short term economic boom before and during the election campaign. Naive voters are unable to understand the politician's manipulation of the economy and its adverse after effects.
On the contrary, they enjoy the boom and re-elect the politician. Because inexperienced voters are prone to this manipulation the common view is that political business cycles are more a phenomenon of less-developed than developed countries (Brender and Drazan 2005) .
The present study investigates the existence of political business cycles in case of Pakistan during the period . During this period Pakistan has undergone parliamentarian and semi-presidential political systems and seven election terms. Single-country studies of the political business cycle often suffer from a small number of elections. However, the political business cycle is a phenomenon that may or may not occur in a country and a multi country study is not able to answer the question if there have been political business cycles in a special country or not. To proof the existence of a political business cycle in Pakistan, which is the aim of this study, a single country study is inevitable.
A number of studies have analyzed politically motivated business cycles for both developed and developing countries. Generally, the empirical political business cycle literature can be divided into three main categories. The
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3 first category attempts to locate political cycles in macroeconomic outcomes.
These models are been focused, almost exclusively, on four macroeconomic indicators: growth, inflation, unemployment, and income (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997; Andrikopoulos et al 2004; Grier 2008; Hibbs 1977; Krause 2005; and Suzuki 1992 (Abrams and Iossifov 2006; Beck 1987; Berger and Woitek 2001; Grier 1987 Grier , 1989 Havrilesky 1993; Maloney et al 2003; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Williams 1990 and Woolley 1994) . To cover all three categories this study focus on growth, unemployment, inflation and some fiscal and monetary policy indicators.
Despite plenty of empirical evidence found on political business cycles for both developed and developing countries, this area of research remains untouched in case of Pakistan. The present study fills the gap. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses model specification and research methodology. Section 3 provides empirical evidence using annual data from 1973 to 2009 for various macroeconomic variables. Section 4 gives a summary of our findings and a conclusion.
MODEL AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2 Model and Research Methodology
Turning to the empirical literature, politico-economic models have been tested with a time-series approach. The usual research strategy is to isolate a key macroeconomic variable and ascertain whether or not in election and preelection years this variable behaves differently than in non-election years.
The earlier procedures entailed simple comparisons of the average value of the actual unemployment and inflation rates in election and non-election years, or according to the party in power. Generalizing this approach, McCallum (1978) and most of those who followed, estimated uni-variate time series models and tested for shifts in the intercept parameter (Richard 1986; Pack 1987; and Keil 1988) . According to this procedure the impact of the political sector is viewed as an exogenous intervention in the economic process, producing a cyclical (Political Business Cycle) or temporary shift in the mean value of the time series. Accordingly, the test is for the significance of an appropriately defined dummy variable -the intervention variable-that is added to a uni-variate ARMA(ARIMA) representation of the series.
To illustrate, let X t be a variable of interest and assume that X can only be positive and follows a stationary first-order autoregressive moving average process. We begin the construction of a benchmark Autoregressive Moving
Average ( The underlying study period covers seven elections : 1977, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2008 . The election dates and corresponding fiscal years are shown in Table 5 in the Appendix.
3 Before 1971, the present Bangladesh was part of Pakistan called West Pakistan. Therefore, we have excluded the earlier time period from the analysis.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3 Empirical Results
First we test predictions of the classic opportunistic political cycle model by Nordhaus (1975) . The model predicts political cycles in unemployment and inflation. Analogical political behavior implies cycles in macroeconomic variables such as growth, money supply, fiscal deficit, and budgetary borrowing etc.
Unemployment and Opportunistic Business Cycle
ARMA model results show that ED 2 is significant and has a negative sign that means during the election year and one year prior to the election year the unemployment rate was reduced by 17 percent in comparison to other years. While in the post-election year the political dummy variable ED 3 was found to be significantly positive that shows unemployment increased (9 percent) when the election year was over (see Table 1 ). This result may attribute to the switch from expansionary to contractionary policy when an incumbent party wins the election, and cancellation of old employment generation schemes if the opposition is elected into office. Both results fully support the political business cycle theories.
Inflation and Opportunistic Business Cycle
Inflation dynamics are another important key to understand the political business cycles. Election periods cause great sensitivity on the side of the government to keep quiet about increases of regulated prices by deferring them to the post-election period. Thus after each election it is common to hear oppositional parties accusing the returned party for exploiting the myopic expectations of voters to boost their probability of winning the election.
However, if the incumbent party looses the election despite deferring price increases, then the winning party would again accuse the former incumbent party for leaving a huge economic burden by not increasing the regulated prices. This has to be fulfilled by the new government who would immediately receive a negative point in its honeymoon period.
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Estimated ARMA results (see Table 2 ) show ED 1 with a negative sign and ED 3 with a positive one. During the election year the inflation is lower by 2.4 percent in comparison to other years. While just after the election, the inflation is significantly boosted by approximately the same magnitude, i.e. Consequently, the budget deficit rises and creates an inflationary pressure and debt sustainability problem in the post-election period.
Both unemployment and inflation results are consistent with the opportunistic political business cycle as the politicians try to maximize their chance of re-election by increasing the employment conditions and controlling the inflation artificially during the election and prior to the election period. Despite the strong support on the inflation and unemployment front, the GDP growth estimated ARMA model does not provide any supporting evidence for the Nordhaus (1975) opportunistic business cycle theory as political variable ED 1 is estimated to be negative i.e. has the wrong sign and ED 3 is found to be insignificant, which can be justified on the argument of miss-allocation of resources during the election period. Although the result seems to be fine, there is concern regarding the stationarity of the variable series raised by Enders (2004) . The basic underlying assumption of the ARMA model is the stationarity of the variable over time, however a simple ADF/DF test shows that inflation and GDP growth are stationary at level, while the unemploy-9 ment is found to be integrated of order one which makes the unemployment ARMA model results suspicious. Therefore, the discussion remains inconclusive and there is a need to further exploration of the phenomena.
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Fiscal and Monetary Variables and Opportunistic
Business Cycle
The original opportunistic business cycle model by Nordhaus (1975) focuses on political cycles in inflation, employment and growth which are induced by monetary policy. However, Rogoff's(1990) show that all variables are integrated of order one that requires 1st difference for the series to be stationary (see Table 4 ). In a second step we have estimated the parsimonious ARIMA model for some fiscal and monetary variable. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The ARIMA model result for government investment states that ED 1 and ED 3 are both negative which implies that government investment has declined by 15 (6) percent during the election (post-election) year. In contrast, the pre-electoral variable ED 1 is positive in the budget deficit equation, which can quantify a 17 percent increase in the budget deficit during 10 Table   3 ). 
